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Abstract 
Our aim in this paper is to argue that individuals join re-
ligious cults as persons, but lose their personhood as their posi-
tion in the group is solidified, becoming simply humans.  First, 
we will outline what constitutes personhood and how persons 
have a specific kind of value, or “dignity”, that renders them wor-
thy of moral respect.  This definition of personhood is drawn 
from the work of Harry Frankfurt (1988) and Bennett Helm 
(2017) and suggests that humans lack the positive freedom to 
choose what to do, what to care about, and hence who to be.  We 
will then examine paradigmatic examples of religious cults to ex-
plicate how they purposefully recruit individuals who lack mean-
ing in their lives, subject them to intense group experiences that 
create major personality change, and consistently deliver absolute 
truth claims that require uniform assent. 
Additionally, we will examine how recruitment tactics 
induce a sense of estrangement from the world in prospective cult 
members, and why cult leaders shower their devotees with affec-
tion in order to acquire control.  This will be explained in terms of 
emotion regulation, drawing from both psychology and neurosci-
ence.  We will also establish that cults speak to a “broadly 
Humean” understanding of the nature of practical reason.  What 
this means is that if a reason can motivate someone to act, it must 
somehow also speak to existing desires or motivations. 
Lastly, we will underscore how fear of social isolation and 
information control is used to undermine the cult devotee’s capac-
ity for “rational control”, as it prevents one from deliberately ar-
riving at a practical judgement that is fully theirs.  We will con-
clude that we ought to consider the implications of this project for 
understanding moral responsibility, such that we can determine 
how cult members willingly abdicate their capacity for agency.  
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Personhood and Humanity 
Recent philosophical work has argued that persons pos-
sess the capacity for rational self-reflection, thus enabling them to 
think critically about the content of their thoughts (Frankfurt, 
1988; Helm, 2017).  This implies that persons possess the positive 
freedom to choose what to do, what to care about, and hence 
whom to be, rather than simply a “negative” freedom from con-
straint.  It is in this sense that personhood is directly linked to au-
tonomy, as we cannot delegate the formation of our identities to 
external forces.  Due to these capacities, persons are bound to 
moral norms that render them worthy of “dignity” or “respect.”  If 
we accept this definition of personhood, it might seem that mem-
bership in a given community is irrelevant to understanding the 
importance of moral norms, as personhood is defined in largely 
individualistic terms.  However, persons are held accountable to 
moral norms through sanctions imposed by fellow members of 
their community.  This does not infringe upon their autonomy 
because they willfully enter these communities in the absence of 
coercion.   
Nonetheless, one might ask, by what authority can others 
impose sanctions?  To answer this question, one must view mem-
bership in a community as how one acquires autonomy (Helm, 
2017).  This view proposes that being morally responsible to one 
another is imperative to sociality itself.  Still, an individualist def-
inition of personhood creates tension between authority and re-
sponsibility.  If others have the ability to shape one’s personhood 
by virtue of sanctions and joint responsibility, then how can their 
influence be anything other than a form of brainwashing?  This 
tension is what differentiates cults from normative groups, as cult 
leaders do not recognize the authority of their devotees to also 
demand compliance with the norms (Helm, 2015).  To constitute 
a legitimate claim over one’s personhood, responsibility and com-
pliance must be two-sided.  Furthermore, this points to a broader 
claim raised by Robert Brandom (1979), in which he suggested 
that freedom consists in rational constraint by self-imposed 
norms.  It should be emphasized that these norms are self-
imposed because their influence is conditional upon agents en-
dorsing them.  Without this exercise of autonomy, these norms 
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would have no claim upon a person and therefore no claim upon 
how they hold others responsible. 
Brandom’s understanding of freedom and rational con-
straint is also shaped by a Kantian theory regarding “concepts.”  
What this means is that persons must actively apply the norms 
they express rather than be forcefully compelled to employ them 
in a systematic way (Brandom, 2007). Consequently, persons ac-
quire the responsibility to both act in agreement with a given 
norm and hold others accountable to following said norm.  This is 
a positive conception of freedom because it underscores one’s 
power to take action, namely to use concepts to commit to the 
norms they express.  It is in this sense that behavior, not merely 
intellectual commitment, determines membership status  
(Brandom, 1979).  In acknowledging this, it is important to high-
light what Helm (2017)  has called the “interpersonal rational 
structure” inherent to normative communities of respect.  This 
implies that even if members hold different roles in a community 
and thereby acquire different responsibilities, they are still bound 
to the same communal norms.  Without the bindingness of com-
munal norms, personhood is lost. 
 
Literature Gap and Paradigmatic Examples  
 The work of Bennett Helm (2017) has briefly posited that 
there are humans, such as those with severe mental handicaps, 
who are not persons.  Similarly, it has suggested that there may be 
non-human creatures, such as robots, who are persons.  However, 
it has not explored how specific communities, which we will call 
communities of disrespect, can lead to a loss of personhood.  It 
has primarily identified normative groups, like sports teams and 
clubs, to show how we are always bound to multiple communities 
of respect simultaneously and why this matters for how we under-
stand our place in the world (Helm, 2017).  Additionally, the tra-
ditions or practices of said communities are not highlighted in 
Helm’s work because these features are irrelevant to understand-
ing their social structure.  Our project will address this literature 
gap by expressing how religious cults are non-normative groups 
that thereby negate what it means to be a responsible agent.  We 
argue that communities of disrespect are groups which instigate a 
loss of personhood by failing to implement an interpersonal ra-
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tional structure and consequently target individuals who are psy-
chologically vulnerable.  This suggests that the necessary condi-
tions for personhood are undermined through affiliation with a 
religious cult, leading to its eventual loss.  To elucidate this claim, 
we will examine three non-controversial historical examples of 
religious cults: The Peoples Temple, the Unification Church, and 
Children of God.  Their history, traditions, and practices will be 
explicated briefly, as this is central to understanding how they are 
communities of disrespect.   
 The Peoples Temple was a new religious movement that 
began in 1954 in Indianapolis, Indiana (Moore, 2000).  The 
church’s founder, Jim Jones, attracted a racially diverse flock due 
to his messages of social equality and racial harmony.  Conse-
quently, the church opened nursing homes and free restaurants, 
offered drug and alcohol counseling to addicts, and provided 
clothing and employment services to the local community.  While 
the church originally espoused Christian ideologies, by the mid-
1960s Jones had swiftly discarded Christianity for belief in his 
own psychic divinity.  He then moved his flock to California and 
began collaborating with politicians to lobby for liberal causes, 
even going so far as to promote communism as the solution for 
society’s ills.  In 1977, after increasingly negative publicity, Jones 
fled the United States for Jonestown, Guyana.  Members who fol-
lowed Jones were told that the United States wanted to destroy 
them and that the only way to “protest the conditions of an inhu-
mane world” was to collectively commit suicide (Jones, 1978).  
Despite its tragic end, The Peoples Temple did not initially re-
semble a community of disrespect.  Rather, Jones manipulated his 
flock into losing personhood by gradually seizing their autonomy 
until the norms they expressed were solely a product of coercion, 
culminating in death.  This tactic is made easier when members 
already display psychological vulnerabilities prior to affiliation. 
 The second religious cult we will examine is the Unifica-
tion Church, colloquially known as the “Moonies.”  The church 
began in 1954 in South Korea by the Reverend Sun Myung 
Moon.  As a teenager, Moon studied the Bible and allegedly had a 
vision in which Jesus commanded him to establish God’s King-
dom on earth and bring peace to the world (Robbins, Anthony, 
Doucas, & Curtis, 1976).  In the 1940s, Moon began promoting 
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this religious belief and was arrested by the North Korean govern-
ment on the grounds that he was spying for South Korea.  After 
serving a five-year prison sentence, Moon returned to South Ko-
rea and established a formal religion.  The result was a hybrid 
movement that borrowed teachings from Confucius and Christi-
anity.  Most notably, Moon emphasized the importance of mar-
riage and instituted mass wedding ceremonies.  In 2012, after the 
death of Moon, his youngest son established the Sanctuary 
Church.  The Sanctuary Church has adopted the teachings of the 
“Moonies” and has encouraged members to bring semi-automatic 
rifles to mass wedding ceremonies as a symbol for one’s ability to 
protect their family.  Similar to the Peoples Temple, the 
“Moonies” did not originally operate like a community of disre-
spect, as Moon’s teachings were akin to mainstream religious in-
stitutions.  However, by slowly encouraging his followers to view 
“the family” and consequently Moon himself as their prime 
source of value, his followers lost their personhood.   
 Lastly, we will use the Children of God movement as a 
paradigmatic example of a religious cult.  The Children of God 
movement originated in 1968 as a group of runaway teenagers 
and hippies who were encouraged by their leader, David Berg, to 
devote themselves to Jesus and engage in promiscuous sex.  The 
group became known for their controversial method of evange-
lism, known as “flirty fishing.”  The principle of flirty fishing is 
that sex is the most successful way to secure converts and show 
God’s love.  Berg and his flock also believed that dead celebrities 
and politicians, like Marilyn Monroe, Richard Nixon, and Win-
ston Churchill, were their spirit helpers who imparted them with 
vital knowledge.  In recent years, the group has been subject to 
legal investigation for pedophilia, which is a principle of the flirty 
fishing method (David and Richardson, 1976).  This group is 
most emblematic of how members of religious cults lack the posi-
tive freedom to choose what to do, as they are frequently manipu-
lated to engage in activities that they would not otherwise do in 
the absence of coercion.  If norms are developed through coercion 
by external forces, then they are not self-imposed.   
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Love-Bombing and Group Affiliation 
 At this point, it is fair to say that we categorize religious 
groups as cults based on the degree to which the members relin-
quish their autonomy to a controlling and charismatic leader 
(Halperin, 1982).  The issue is then how these individuals come 
to willingly lose their autonomy and ability for self-reflection.  In 
this section, we will argue that cult recruiters engage with pro-
spective members in a manner that directly attacks the foundation 
for individuality and personhood.  By using emotion regulation to 
shift normative reasoning based on genuine desires, to instead 
goal-directed practical reasoning in persons, invokes a willing-
ness to join the cult and indicates the moment that personhood is 
lost and the agent becomes just human.   
 To be a person is to have the ability for critical self-
reflection such that an agent can act based on its genuine desires 
and intrinsic values (Helm, 2015).  In this case, desires of this 
type are reasons that motivate an agent to act in accordance with 
what is worth living for.  This type of reasoning differs from mere 
goal-directed practical reasoning, insofar that it is not motivating 
the agent to act in accordance for some particular end.  Frankfurt 
(1988) elaborates on this distinction when he refers to desires and 
volitions; such that a desire is any reason to act and a volition is 
an agent wanting the respective reason to be its will, or have the 
ability to cause action.  In the case of cults, the distinction is elab-
orated when members choose to join based on what they deem as 
values integral to the type of life they find worthwhile and pro-
vides the preservation of self-identity.  This differs from becom-
ing a member for the purpose of preventing the loneliness and 
stress that occasionally accompanies one’s life.  This would be 
acting based on genuine desires or a goal-directed end, respec-
tively.   
 One might raise the issue that the distinction between act-
ing based on genuine values and practical reasons is flawed; be-
cause genuine values could be reasons that cause the agent to act 
to achieve some particular end (Brandom, 1979).  A response to 
elucidate the necessary distinction is elaborated through the refer-
ence of how we embrace our societal roles.  One of the expected 
roles of a professor is to publish academic work.  The by-product 
of providing this high-quality service involves a rise in prestige, 
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as demonstrated by those who won the Nobel prize.  Thus, in one 
instance the agent could be motivated to act for the purpose of 
achieving fame, or it could perceive its role as one involving the 
enrichment and distribution of knowledge.  In the first case, the 
agent is acting based on rational goal-directed behavior.  It wants 
to publish more articles for the purpose of gaining fame.  Howev-
er, in the latter instance, the agent takes a more holistic approach 
to its role and views all knowledge as valuable without putting 
emphasis on just those impactful enough to win a Nobel prize.  
An approach of this kind requires that the agent has intrinsic val-
ues motivating its actions, as indicated by the action not being 
tied to some other end. 
 If what it means to be a person involves the capacity to act 
based on genuine values, then this serves as a distinction between 
persons and humans, which many argue only display rationally 
goal-directed behavior (Helm, 2001).  As such, prospective cult 
members are initially persons, but as they progress through the 
stages of recruitment they lose the objective quality of person-
hood until they become mere humans.  Halperin (1982) indicated 
that the primary recruitment strategy is love-bombing, which is a 
technique that promotes the effusive and total approval of the pro-
spective member’s behavior.  We argue that this technique works 
in conjunction with emotion regulation and as a form of social 
reinforcement for the foot-in-the-door phenomenon.   
 Many commonly believe that the emotional state an agent 
is experiencing can cause actions of a specific kind to the extent 
that we can use behavior to efficiently judge what emotions the 
agent is feeling under a specific context (Churchland, 1985).  As 
such, behavioral neuroscientists demonstrated that behaviors can 
be reduced to neuronal activity to the extent that manipulating the 
brain directly can give rise to the expected behaviors.  Gobrogge 
et al. (2017) showed that two neurotransmitters, vasopressin and 
serotonin, modulate the aggressive and social behaviors in their 
model organism, the prairie voles.  These animals form naturally 
occuring pair bonds with monogamous sexual partners, thus mak-
ing them ideal to study the neural circuitry of pair bonding.  The 
amygdala and hypothalamus are brain regions known to modulate 
emotions, and Gobrogge et al. (2017) recorded that significantly 
more serotonin is concentrated in the posterior dorsal medial 
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amygdala (MeAPD) and hypothalamus when the animals are nat-
urally displaying social behaviors to their mate.  In contrast, a sig-
nificantly higher concentration of vasopressin was recorded in 
this area when the animals were naturally displaying aggressive 
behaviors towards other voles that were unaffiliated.  The re-
searchers also concluded that artificially raising the levels of sero-
tonin or vasopressin can induce the animals to display social be-
havior to unaffiliated voles or attack their mate and offspring; 
both behaviors that would not naturally occur.  These results sug-
gest that emotional states, whether naturally or artificially in-
duced, can be reduced to brain states and cause predictable action.   
If we take the reductionist argument from behavioral neu-
roscience as valid, then we can pose that cult recruiters are ma-
nipulating the neuronal biological circuitry in prospective mem-
bers, such that they have no other choice but to join the group.  
Much similar to the prairie voles having no other choice but to 
attack their mate in the presence of high concentrations of vaso-
pressin in the MeAPD.  An agent can defend against this argu-
ment by indicating that this level of analysis implicates a stimulus
-response relationship that need not rely on personhood for the 
behavior to be actuated.  Insofar that the agent is acting against its 
will or not caring to prefer one reason over the other to motivate 
action, then personhood is by consequence already lost.  This is 
because the agent is not acting based on reasons (Helm, 2015; 
Frankfurt, 1988).  This argument is therefore not an attack on the 
validity of our reasoning because the issue does not concern the 
action of persons who have the freedom of the will. 
 Although the argument does not concern persons with the 
respective freedoms and agency, if we take it as valid the reduc-
tionist argument does not hold with the neuroscientific evidence.  
If we change the operationalization of emotional experience from 
a behavioral response to shared experiences in correlation to brain 
states, we still do not observe a direct correlation between brain 
states and psychological states.  By using the results from fMRI 
studies, some have argued that across the brain there are specific 
regions that are activated for religious experience, such as enter-
ing a trance (d’Aquili and Newberg, 1993).  The limitations of 
these results are that there is no current method to ensure that the 
participants are paying attention to the relevant stimuli throughout 
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the experiment.  This ensures that the results are not skewed by 
mind-wandering.  Secondly, the results do not take into account 
the subjectivity of human experiences, because although each 
brain might be activated differently, the conclusion is an average 
activation among all participants, thus reducing the validity of the 
effects of subjective experiences in shaping behavior.  Further-
more, multiple stimuli can produce the same neuronal patterning.  
Insofar that this is happening independent of context, then we 
have to view religious experiences as no different from non-
religious experiences (Cunningham, 2011).  Contexts are essen-
tial for the interpretation of behavior and psychological states be-
cause in one instance I could be raising my right hand to ask a 
question while in the other I am attempting to stretch or reach for 
an object.  Although the scenario involves the same behavior and 
neuronal activity, a reductionist argument does not provide the 
distinction and level of analysis as to how desires, reasons, and 
emotional states can work together to motivate action and shape 
intentionality (Davidson, 1963).  The results providing support 
for a reductionist account of emotions in driving actions do not 
stand up to scrutiny and internal validity, thus a non-reductionist 
holistic account is better since it handles much of the limitations 
faced by a reductionist argument.   
 We argued that persons not only differ from mere humans 
in that agents with personhood can act from genuine values and 
have the freedom of will such that they can choose which reasons 
to motivate action.  As a consequence of arguing against a reduc-
tionist view of the emotions, we propose that love-bombing ma-
nipulates emotion regulation in a manner that affects reasoning 
and agency; and is not identical to a stimulus-response interac-
tion.  The first step of the love-bombing technique involves the 
cult recruiters showering the prospective members with a sense of 
total approval and respect for them to have the belief that socie-
ty’s laws and structures have disappointed and caused them to 
feel alienated (Halperin, 1982).  This sense of approval and re-
spect for self-integrity causes the prospective members to have a 
desire to be a part of the recruiter’s group because it provides a 
sense of community where there is no restriction on agency and 
personal values appear to be shared group values (Helm, 2001; 
Halperin, 1982).  This desire is a type of reason that accompanies 
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the trust that the prospective member has toward the recruiter.  
Trust, in this case, we take to be a reactive attitude that involves a 
complementation of reasons and emotions driving the belief that 
we can hold an agent accountable to act according to some norm 
if they are to be a valid member of the group (Holton, 1994; 
Helm, 2015).  In this case, the prospective member is forming a 
trust that he can fully express his identity in this religious cult; 
which is guided by the belief that he will be accepted by other 
members and the emotional desire to belong to a community. 
 Halperin (1982) suggests that as prospective members 
make the decision to join a cult, they are welcomed and placed 
through a type of ritual that engages them to commit to minor 
acts, such as playing a game with constantly changing arbitrary 
rules, to major events like sharing intimate details about their life 
to the group.  We argue that this method is no different than the 
psychological effects of the foot-in-the-door phenomenon be-
cause both move from a small request to the agent forming a larg-
er commitment to action.  The effect is more pronounced when 
there are social reinforcement methods employed, as suggested by 
Crano and Sivacek’s (1982) results, where they concluded that 
participants who received a positive reward in the initial induction 
were more altruistic when engaging in future tasks, in contrast to 
controls and those punished in the initial induction.  In the case of 
cults, the reinforcement for engaging in the small inductive tasks 
is the fact that initiates have the strong desire to be members of 
this community as a way of preventing the feeling of neglect and 
isolation from the dominant society.  The need for acceptance 
goes to the extent that the agent can agree to larger inductive 
tasks, such as engaging in promiscuous sex.  Insofar that mem-
bers are frequently engaged in activities that cause them to act not 
based on their genuine desires, but instead on practical reasoning 
to prevent some negative end, then it indicates the transitory peri-
od where the agent loses personhood and becomes simply human.  
Once this transition is complete, the agent is now totally willing 
to act in accordance with any group idea because they have a sole 
desire for self-preservation and the cult provides that security.  
Self-preservation, in this case, transcends the biological definition 
to promote the persistence of life, for we are taking the term to 
suggest a perseverance and commitment to beliefs, even if that 
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means committing suicide in order to prove one’s loyalty to the 
group.  If this form of self-preservation was merely biological, 
then members would not commit acts resulting in death.  Howev-
er, since this form of self-preservation is tied to group identity, 
then members will do anything that this group identity requires. 
 
Social Isolation and Information Control 
 Although love-bombing is a vital recruitment tactic, reli-
gious cults also speak to a “broadly Humean” understanding of 
the nature of practical reason.  What this means is that if a reason 
can motivate someone to act, it must somehow also speak to ex-
isting desires or motivations.  Given this understanding of practi-
cal reason and motivation, others have the ability to affect what is 
rational for person X to do in so far as their values or motivations 
are all a part of the world to which person X responds in acting 
(Helm, 2017).  An action cannot be conceived of as rational un-
less it conforms to one’s existing desires.  Consequently, cult 
leaders specifically look to individuals who are seeking meaning, 
come from dysfunctional families, or are suffering severe psycho-
logical distress because they know they will respond to their ab-
solute truth claims and promises of security.  We can see this phe-
nomenon when examining The Peoples Temple, as Jones specifi-
cally targeted impoverished communities, drug addicts, and the 
homeless (Hall, 1987).   
Past studies have provided support for this claim by find-
ing that cult members report a high prevalence of psychiatric and 
addictive disorders during the year preceding affiliation with a 
group (Galanter, 1982; Spero, 1982; Rousselet, Duretete, Hardou-
in, & Grall-Bronnec, 2017).  Additionally, Rousselet et al. (2017) 
found that cult members frequently report life dissatisfaction as a 
primary factor for joining the group.  Similar to those afflicted 
with addictive disorders, cult members report the existence of 
problematic familial relationships, which render them vulnerable 
to commitment (Repetti, Taylor, & Seeman, 2002; Buxant, Sa-
roglou, Casalfiore, & Christians, 2007).  If the family network is 
a vulnerability factor, then this also suggests that it can become a 
protective factor if family members promote leaving the cultic 
group by speaking to existing desires or motivations.  Nonethe-
less, for some individuals, cult membership can lead to a decrease 
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in depressive disorders, as it can become a coping strategy 
(Rousselet et al., 2017).   
 Religious cults also use fear of social isolation to motivate 
members into remaining; thereby altering what is rational for 
them to do.  This process begins when cult members are forced to 
sever ties with their original social environment, such that they 
remain detached from outside influence (Rousselet et al., 2017).  
Once the cult member is removed from their original social envi-
ronment, they have nowhere to turn but to their charismatic lead-
er, who will swiftly dismiss them if they fail to obey.  When 
Rousselet et al. (2017) interviewed former cult members regard-
ing the factors that motivated them to stay in the group, they 
found that one’s relationship with a cult leader and ultimately 
one’s dependence on the group for identity formation was the 
most cited factor.  This form of manipulation may lead to the de-
velopment of a dependent personality disorder (Burke and Perma-
nente, 2006).  It also induces anxiety in some cult members, as 
they regularly fear being disassociated from other members.  
They ultimately may fear rejection or abuse resulting from the 
constraints imposed by the cult leader.   
 Additionally, Rousselet et al.’s (2017) study identified 
that many cult members abandon their education or quit their jobs 
at the request of their leader.  This tactic is exemplified by the 
“Moonies”, as Moon frequently recruited on college campuses, 
while later encouraging students to drop out.   Jim Jones also en-
couraged his followers to sell their homes and give all their wages 
to the collective good of the Temple (Galanter, 1982). Without 
the support of family, friends, and one’s career, many cult mem-
bers find it difficult to consider departing the group even when 
they no longer believe in its teachings.  It is in this sense that they 
have relinquished their personhood and become mere humans, for 
they lack the freedom to choose what to do and who to be accord-
ing to rationality.   
 Coupled with fear of social isolation is information con-
trol, which cult leaders use in order to prevent their devotees from 
mentally confronting information that may motivate their depar-
ture.  This undermines one’s capacity for “rational control”, as it 
prevents one from deliberately arriving at a practical judgement 
that is fully theirs (Helm, 2001).  Furthermore, if cult members 
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were free to view content denouncing the teachings of their 
group, then perhaps they would be emboldened to leave or at least 
possess the desire to leave.  One may contest that even normative 
groups, like mainstream religious institutions, are not happy when 
their followers deliberately seek information criticizing the 
group’s teachings.  However, it is the possibility for retribution 
that distinguishes cults from normative groups.  Whether cult 
members are emboldened to seek this information or merely 
stumble upon it, the group’s leader punishes them accordingly. 
 Additionally, an interpersonal rational structure is not es-
tablished since cult leaders do not recognize the authority of their 
devotees to also demand compliance with the norms (Helm, 
2017).  For example, even though Jones’ followers sold their 
homes and donated copious amounts of money to the collective 
good of the Temple, he used these funds for lavish personal vaca-
tions (Lucky, 2017).  If The Peoples Temple operated within an 
interpersonal rational structure, where members and leaders are 
subjected to the same communal norms, then Jones’ followers 
would be able to demand that he also donate his money to the col-
lective good of the Temple.  Again, we can see this discrepancy 
between cults and normative groups when examining the Chil-
dren of God group.  During an interview with BBC, a former 
Children of God member expressed that there were severe conse-
quences if someone asked questions or brought bad publicity to 
the group by failing to appropriately answer outsiders questions 
(Lucky, 2017).  Nonetheless, the group’s leader brought negative 
publicity to the group when he came under investigation for alle-
gations of sexual abuse (Goodstein, 2005). One may contest to 
this claim by pointing to examples of hypocrisy in mainstream 
religious institutions.  However, it is the level of hypocrisy and its 
ability to work in consort with other manipulative factors that dis-
tinguishes cults from normative groups, thereby leading to a loss 
of personhood.  A mainstream religious group may resemble a 
cult in some aspects but not others, or may weakly fit the defini-
tion we have posited in this paper.  However, this does not defini-
tively make it a cult.   
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Synthesis and Implications for Moral Responsibility 
 This paper provides a framework in which personhood is 
lost, by using the generally accepted notions of how genuine val-
ues and rationally goal-directed practical reasoning serves to dis-
tinguish persons from humans.  We focused on how cult recruit-
ers target a specific group of individuals that lack a sense of 
meaning and acceptance in their life.  The primary tactic used is 
love-bombing, which subjugates the initiates to group activities 
that dissolve the foundation of agency and decision-making by 
following the same psychological principles implicated in the foot
-in-the-door phenomenon.  We also argued that the structure of 
cults, information control, and the need for self-preservation that 
transcends the biological life all serve as factors that promote a 
willingness to remain in the group. 
 In some cases, however, we argue that members want to 
prevent the sense of social isolation, and so this is enough reason 
to stay even if they are encouraged to act contrary to their intrin-
sic values.  The issue then becomes who should be responsible for 
the moral actions perpetrated by the group.  In one case, we can 
blame the leader for purposefully implicating the recruitment tac-
tic based on some personal goal.  However, we could also pose 
the argument that prospective members joined the cult because of 
their already existing desires to feel accepted in a community 
where they can fully express their identity.   
 Henrich (2015) argues that humans have the drive to fol-
low the command of those we deem to be prestigious because of 
the evolutionary benefits it had in prolonging the life of our spe-
cies.  He continues to suggest that by siding with a prestigious 
leader, our hunter-gatherer ancestors could more easily learn the 
necessary actions needed to survive instead of using the slow pro-
cess of trial and error learning.  If we apply this definition of pres-
tige to cult leaders, then we can see that members also perceive 
the cult leader as an integral figure necessary for their survival 
(Halperin, 1982).  Furthermore, the results from Milgram’s 
(1964) experiment suggests that participants are more willing to 
act in accordance with someone they perceive as prestigious, even 
if this means they must act against their reasons. In this experi-
ment, a significant proportion of the participants were willing to 
shock the other at a deadly voltage without questioning the com-
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mand from the researcher they perceived to know what is best.  In 
this case, we could conclude that members of a cult are not re-
sponsible for their morally repulsive actions because they are 
brainwashed to behave accordingly by their leader.   
 If we accept that the leader’s commands are more influen-
tial than the group’s reasons to act, then we would be arguing 
contrary to evidence suggesting that much of the cult’s structure 
and behavior is maintained as a result of member dynamics in-
stead of the leader’s commands.  The results from Asch’s (1951) 
experiment suggests that participants were more willing to side 
with the majority of the group, even if the choice was contrary to 
the agent’s perception and beliefs. In this experiment, the extent 
to which social pressure from a majority could induce conformity 
was assessed by having participants judge the length of multiple 
lines.  Results indicated that even though many participants knew 
their responses were wrong, they sided with the majority to pre-
vent a feeling of isolation.  Halperin (1982) provides evidence 
supporting the claim that much of the implementation of atro-
cious actions are done by members of the cult who are most loyal 
to the leader. To some extent, this vindicates the leader from 
much of the responsibility since he is not directly engaged in the 
action. Insofar that cult members show their compliance and loy-
alty by signaling through action, then they should be responsible 
for their choices because they are displaying loyalty to the group, 
not directly to the charismatic leader.   
If we accept that personhood is dependent on the agent 
acting based on genuine values, then we can also propose a 
framework in which personhood is lost independent of religious 
cults. This will enable us to evaluate the process through which 
persons can adopt goal-directed reasons that motivate action and 
consequently how we can hold those agents morally responsible. 
A particular example of this is Stockholm Syndrome, as it can 
cause one to act contrary to their intrinsic values. Specifically, 
Stockholm Syndrome is a psychological response in which hos-
tages begin to identify with their captors ideas and beliefs as a 
biological survival strategy (Alexander & Klein, 2009).  The ac-
tions resulting from cult membership and agents suffering from 
Stockholm Syndrome should be treated as a distinct but related 
phenomena.  They are similar in that personhood is lost because 
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the agents are acting based on goal-directed reasons, but the pro-
cess is different. In the case of Stockholm Syndrome, agents lose 
their personhood and identity forcefully, normally through cap-
ture and torture techniques by an enemy force.  By identifying 
with their captor, their sole desire is to prolong survival.  Howev-
er, cult members willingly abdicate their agency and personhood 
because of their need for acceptance and desire to preserve the 
group’s ideas, which is amplified through love-bombing.  It is in 
this sense that cult members do not care if they die, as the idea 
will prevail even if they die. Future researchers should focus on 
the process leading to a loss of personhood, for this will dictate 
how we should hold agents morally responsible for their actions. 
We should also consider the implications of this project 
for understanding how normative groups can quickly become 
communities of disrespect when the leaders decide to implement 
tactics that directly attack the foundation for agency based on 
genuine values. This is reinforced by the susceptibility of pro-
spective members, who can easily be subjugated to the group's 
beliefs.  To maintain communities of respect, we should ensure 
that members and leaders are held equally accountable for their 
actions and behave in accordance with self-imposed communal 
norms. By failing to apply retribution, we would be encouraging 
members that it is appropriate to accept a leader’s hypocritical 
behavior toward their group, thus setting the precursors for relin-
quishing authority and promoting the dissolution of personhood. 
Insofar that there is no mutual respect, then the bindingness of 
norms is lost and members who choose to join and remain in the 
group are acting contrary to the normativity of rationality. Thus, 
they are acting contrary to what persons ought to do.  
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